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COULD GOD DO SOMETHING EVIL?
A MOLINIST SOLUTION TO
THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE FREEDOM
R. Zachary Manis

One important version of the problem of divine freedom is that, if God is essentially good, and if freedom logically requires being able to do otherwise,
then God is not free with respect to willing the good, and thus He is not
morally praiseworthy for His goodness. I develop and defend a broadly Molinist solution to this problem, which, I argue, provides the best way out of
the difficulty for orthodox theists who are unwilling to relinquish the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. The solution is that the divine essence includes
the property of transworld goodness: i.e., for any possible morally significant
choice that God could have faced, if God had actually faced it, God would
have chosen to will the good. This view makes coherent the otherwise paradoxical theological intuition that it is within God’s power to do something
evil, but He would not ever do such a thing.

Introduction
Could God do something evil? This question is the point of departure for
a number of critical reflections on the logical consistency of the attributes
typically ascribed to God by orthodox theists. One such argument, popularized by Nelson Pike, pits divine goodness against divine omnipotence.1
The primary aim of the present essay is to explore the closely-related issue
of the apparent incompatibility between the attributes of divine goodness
and divine freedom that the question sometimes is thought to reveal.
To begin, consider the following set of propositions—all of which, historically, theological libertarians (e.g., Arminians) have been inclined to affirm:
(1) Freedom (of the kind required for moral responsibility) logically
requires being able to do otherwise.
(2) God is free (in whatever way is required for being a moral agent).
(3) God is essentially perfectly good—i.e., of metaphysical necessity,
God wills the good.
1
Nelson Pike, “Omnipotence and God’s Ability to Sin,” American Philosophical Quarterly 6
(July 1969): 208–216, reprinted in Divine Commands and Morality, ed. Paul Helm (Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 67–82.
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The logical incompatibility of these three propositions is apparent, as
Jonathan Edwards forcefully argued against his Arminian opponents.2 If
freedom requires being able to do otherwise, and God cannot do otherwise than will the good, then God is not free with respect to willing the
good. But which claim should the theist give up? Prima facie, none of the
three options is satisfactory to those who are libertarians. To deny (1) is to
reject a version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), a version
which most libertarians regard as an essential component of their theory
of freedom.3 To give up (2) is to claim that God does not possess the kind
of freedom that is a necessary condition of moral responsibility, which
entails that God is not a moral agent.4 But orthodox theism affirms that
God is a moral agent: insofar as God is morally praiseworthy, it must be
that He is morally responsible for His actions. To deny that God is morally praiseworthy would be to deny that He is maximally perfect and
that He is a proper object of worship—conclusions no orthodox theist
can abide.
Thus, the libertarian is led to question the truth of (3). But here she faces a
dilemma. Divine goodness must be one of two types: either God is essentially
perfectly good, meaning that God is perfectly good at every time in every possible world in which He exists, or God is contingently perfectly good, meaning that God is, as a matter of fact, perfectly good—that is, God is perfectly
good in the actual world—but He fails to be so in other possible worlds.5
Proposition (3) claims the former, and orthodox theists generally feel hard
pressed to retain this proposition, as relinquishing it seems immediately to
confront one with a host of philosophical and theological problems.6 First,
2
Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1957). See also “Jonathan Edwards on Divine and Human Freedom,” chapter 4 of William L. Rowe, Can God Be Free? (Oxford, New York, et. al.: Oxford University Press, 2004),
54–73.
3
The version of PAP considered here is different from the version Harry Frankfurt critiques in “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” (Journal of Philosophy, 66 [1969]:
829–839). The version Frankfurt considers is the proposition that moral responsibility requires
alternate possibilities, rather than the proposition that freedom requires alternate possibilities.
4
The assumption that freedom is a necessary condition of moral responsibility is disputed
by advocates of semi-compatibilism, but it seems fair to say that the majority consensus remains that freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. At any rate, I will assume this for
present purposes.
5
Various types (and degrees) of imperfect goodness are possible for some beings, of
course, but the orthodox theist will consider none of these as genuine candidates for the type
of goodness ascribed to God.
6
One such worry—a common first reaction to the claim that God is contingently good—is
misplaced: namely, that if God is merely contingently good, He might at any moment do
something evil, and thus believers have no basis for placing absolute trust in Him. This
worry is both irrelevant and confused. It is irrelevant, because orthodox theists on both sides
of the debate about the nature of divine goodness agree that God is perfectly good at all
times (past, present, and future) in the actual world; the present debate concerns whether
there are merely possible worlds in which God does something evil. Put differently, the
debate over whether Yahweh (or some other alleged divine being) is in fact evil is another
issue altogether, and insofar as it is a genuine problem, it is one that burdens proponents of
divine essential goodness and proponents of divine contingent goodness equally. The worry
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it seems intuitively plausible that a being who does evil in some possible
world is less perfect than a being who wills only the good in every possible
world, in which case a contingently good being is not the greatest possible
being—i.e., it seems that a contingently good being is not maximally perfect. Second, many would consider the property of being essentially good
to be a conceptual requirement of being God. If so, then any being who does
evil in any possible world is, of metaphysical necessity, not truly God. For
such reasons, theists have felt led, more or less en masse, to the view that
God is essentially perfectly good. Yet, as we have seen, the libertarian who
endorses this claim—given that she also endorses PAP—is caught in a contradiction. How, then, is the libertarian to resolve this difficulty?
In the next section, I will present a possible solution to this problem—
one that seems to me the best response available to those theists who are
unwilling to relinquish or mitigate PAP. The view is broadly Molinist in
its orientation, relying crucially on the assumption that there are some
true counterfactuals of freedom, which will make it unpalatable to some
libertarians. I will not here defend the view that there are some true counterfactuals of freedom, but rather attempt to show that, if one is willing to
accept this Molinist starting point, a satisfying solution to the problem of
divine goodness and freedom presents itself.
I. A Broadly Molinist Solution to the Problem
The Molinist discussion of counterfactuals of freedom typically focuses
on those counterfactuals that apply to creatures. The basic claim is that
propositions of the form
If P were in C, P would freely choose to do A,
can be true, where P refers to some agent,7 C to some possible but unactual
circumstance, and A to some action. There are well-known applications of
this assumption by Molinists, including attempts to construct solutions to
the problem of evil8 and to the problem of reconciling divine foreknowledge (and/or sovereignty) with human freedom.9 Once one has accepted
is confused, as well, because it suggests that the believer’s absolute trust in God is misplaced
on the grounds that God’s status as a perfect moral agent might change abruptly, upon God’s
suddenly deciding to do something evil. But given divine foreknowledge, God’s moral status cannot change in any world. If God wills evil at any time in a world W, He has known
from eternity past in W that He would will evil at that time. But the intention to will evil at
a future time is itself evil. Thus God’s moral status does not change in W at the moment that
He actually wills the evil action. In W, God is eternally less than perfectly good. On this point,
see Thomas V. Morris, Anselmian Explorations: Essays in Philosophical Theology (Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 56–59.
7
More precisely, P refers to the instantiation of some individual essence. This allows the
Molinist to avoid the inclusion of possible but unactual beings in her ontology.
8
See, for example, Alvin Plantinga, “God, Evil, and the Metaphysics of Freedom,” chapter
IX of The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, New York, et. al.: Oxford University Press, 1974), 164–195.
9
See, for example, William Lane Craig, “The Middle-Knowledge View,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, ed. James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Dowers Grove, IL: InterVarsity
Press, 2001), 119–159.
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the basic assumption of the possibility of true counterfactuals of freedom,
however, there is no apparent reason to limit the scope of their reference
to creatures. If there are true counterfactuals of freedom, then it would
seem that some of them are propositions about what God would freely do
in other possible but unactual circumstances.
To see the relevance of this point to the problem of divine freedom, consider first the use that Alvin Plantinga makes of counterfactuals of freedom in his Free Will Defense. To demonstrate the logical compatibility of
God and evil, Plantinga argues that the proposition that all creaturely essences are transworldly depraved is possibly true. He defines the concept
of transworld depravity as follows:
An essence E suffers from transworld depravity if and only if for every world W
such that E entails the properties is significantly free in W and always does what
is right in W, there is a state of affairs T and an action A such that
(1) T is the largest state of affairs God strongly actualizes in W,
(2) A is morally significant for E’s instantiation in W,
and
(3) if God had strongly actualized T, E’s instantiation would have gone
wrong with respect to A.10

The basic idea is this.11 An essence E is transworldly depraved if it is such
that, in every possible world W that God could have weakly actualized in
which E is instantiated and in which the instantiation of E in W performs
morally significant actions, the instantiation of E goes wrong with respect
to at least one of these actions. Even though there are possible worlds
in which the instantiation of a transworldly depraved essence always
chooses right, none of these worlds can be actualized (neither strongly
nor weakly) by God.12 Such a world could be actualized only if the instantiation of the essence would freely choose to go right on every occasion of
being faced with a morally significant decision. So if every creaturely es10
Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, 188. Plantinga characterizes strong actualization as follows: “In the strong sense, God can actualize only what he can cause to be actual; in that sense
he cannot actualize any state of affairs including the existence of creatures who freely take
some action or other” (ibid., 173). He then distinguishes this from weak actualization: “What
is at issue is not the question whether each world is such that God could have actualized it in
the strong sense, but (roughly) whether for each world W there is something he could have
done—some series of actions he could have taken—such that if he had, W would have been
actual” (ibid.).
11
This paragraph is adopted from my “On Transworld Depravity and the Heart of the
Free Will Defense,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59 (2006): 154.
12
God cannot strongly actualize such worlds, because strongly actualizing a complete
world violates the freedom of the creatures in that world (and thus the resulting world
would not be one containing free creatures). He cannot weakly actualize such worlds, because the weak actualization of a morally perfect world requires the “cooperation” of the
free agents in that world, and if every creaturely essence is transworldly depraved, then, no
matter which essences are instantiated in the state of affairs God chooses to strongly actualize, the resulting agents will not cooperate to actualize a morally perfect world.
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sence is transworldly depraved, God cannot actualize any world containing free creatures but no evil, even though He is omnipotent.
If the concept of transworld depravity is coherent,13 it suggests a parallel concept that is of significant interest to the libertarian in addressing the
problem of divine freedom. We could label the concept “transworld goodness,” and define it as follows:
An essence E enjoys transworld goodness if and only if for every world W
and every state of affairs T that W includes, if
(1) E entails the property is significantly free in W, and
(2) T includes E’s instantiation’s facing a choice about whether to perform action A but does not include E’s instantiation’s making a
choice, and
(3) A is morally significant for E’s instantiation in W,
then
(4) if T were actual, E’s instantiation would have willed the good with
respect to A.
An essence E is transworldly good if it is such that, in every possible scenario T in which E is instantiated and in which the instantiation of E faces
a morally significant action, the instantiation of E would have willed the
good in that scenario if it were actual. Even though there are possible
states of affairs in which the instantiation of a transworldly good essence
does not will the good, none of these states of affairs would, in fact, be
actualized by the free choice of a transworldly good being, were that being given the choice. A world in which such a being does evil could be
actualized only if that being would freely choose not to will the good on
some occasion of being faced with a morally significant decision. But the
instantiation of a transworldly good essence would not, as a matter of fact,
make such a choice. I stress “as a matter of fact,” because the claim being
made here concerns counterfactuals of freedom, which are contingent. If
E is an essence that possesses transworld goodness, then it is contingently
true that, for any circumstance T that includes the instantiation of E facing
a morally significant choice, if T were actual, the instantiation of E would
(freely) choose to will the good.
Recall now the dilemma for the theological libertarian discussed in
section I: either God is contingently perfectly good or He is essentially
perfectly good, and both options lead to theological difficulties. The significance of the concept of transworld goodness is that it allows a way between the horns of the dilemma: one may hold that the divine essence enjoys
transworld goodness. On the proposed view, God is contingently perfectly
good. However, the variety of contingent goodness here being ascribed
13

I argue, in the essay mentioned in footnote 11, that it is coherent.
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to God is better than—in the sense of theologically preferable to—“bare” contingent goodness, and it is in this sense that it provides a solution to the
dilemma. The concept of transworld goodness allows Molinists, at least,
to embrace the first horn of the dilemma without being impaled.
To see this, consider what many orthodox theists want to say about
God: that He could do evil (because He is omnipotent) but He wouldn’t
ever do anything evil (because He is perfectly good). Note that this claim
is stronger than the claim that God could do evil but won’t. The latter is a
claim only about the actual world: it says that there are possible worlds
in which God does evil (because He could do so, and a being’s having the
ability to perform some action requires, minimally, that there is a possible world in which the being performs that action)14 but that the actual
world is not one of these worlds. This claim is too weak to capture the
orthodox theist’s intuitions about the magnitude of the goodness of God.
Such theists want to claim not only that God never has done (and never
will do) anything evil, but also that He never would do such a thing. The
latter is a modal claim, a claim not only about the actual world but also
about merely possible worlds. The concept of transworld goodness allows the theist to express, in technical terms, this commonsense theological intuition, without going so far as to claim that God lacks the ability to
do evil. To say that the divine essence enjoys transworld goodness is to
say that God would never, under any circumstances, do such a thing as
perform an evil action, even though it is (necessarily) within His power
to do so.
It is worth emphasizing that the solution just outlined does not require
the assumptions of a full-fledged Molinism, but only the minimal claim
that there are true counterfactuals of freedom. I suspect that, these days,
the number of philosophers who accept Molinism is nearly as great as the
number of libertarians who accept this minimal claim, and it is for this reason that I have called this solution a broadly Molinist one. Those willing
to adopt the minimal claim but not a full-fledged Molinism will perhaps
forgive me this terminological imprecision.

14
This principle is somewhat controversial. Thomas Talbott defends the remarkable thesis that certain beings—including God and perfected saints—have it within their power
to perform actions that it is logically impossible for them to perform. See “On the Divine
Nature and the Nature of Divine Freedom,” Faith and Philosophy 5 (Jan. 1988): 3–24. Though
I would not go so far as Rowe, who considers Talbott’s view “an instance of ‘language gone
on holiday’” (Can God Be Free?, 149), I cannot fathom how Talbott’s thesis could be true.
Since the range of possible worlds exhausts the range of what is broadly logically possible,
if there is no world in which an agent performs some action, then it is not possible for the
agent to perform that action. But it seems to me self-evident that no being, not even God,
has it within its power to do something that it is impossible for that being to do. Thus, I
conclude that a necessary (though of course not sufficient) condition of an agent’s being
able to perform some action is that there exists a possible world in which the agent performs the action. In Talbott’s defense, though, I have not here given an argument against
his position; I have simply reported my intuition that a certain proposition strikes me as
self-evident.
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II. Some Objections
Does appeal to the concept of transworld goodness allow a Molinist (and
anyone else who accepts the possibility of true counterfactuals of freedom)
to successfully resolve the problem of divine freedom? In what follows I
will attempt to answer this by way of assessing what I take to be the most
important objections to the solution that I have sketched. I will argue that,
in each case, a Molinist can meet the objection decisively. The first two
objections will be presented together, as they are variations of one another.
Objection 1: It follows from the Molinist solution that there are possible worlds in which God does evil. But this is incoherent. Being perfectly
good is a conceptual requirement of being God. Thus, any being who does
evil in some possible world W at some time t does not meet the qualifications for being God in that world at that time. And since everything is
what it is essentially, any being that is not God at some time in W is not
God at any time in W.15 So there is no possible world in which some being possesses both the property of being less than perfectly good at some
time and the property of being God; a fortiori, there is no possible world
in which God does evil.
Objection 2: It follows from the Molinist solution that there are possible worlds in which God does evil. But this is incoherent. Being perfectly
good is an essential property of (the being who is in fact) God. Were God
suddenly to lack this property, He would thereby cease to exist, which is
impossible. So there is no possible world in which God does evil. If God
exists, He is perfectly good in every world in which He exists16—i.e., He
is essentially good.
Response to Objections 1 and 2: As mentioned above, these are variations
of the same critique. Objection 1 presents the de dicto version of the critique, while Objection 2 presents it in its de re form. Accordingly, the response to both objections is the same: they are question-begging. Precisely
what is in question in the view under discussion is whether God is essentially good, so it will not do simply to insist that God is essentially good.
Yet this is what each of the above objections does. Objection 1 does so by
including the property of being perfectly good among the conceptual requirements of being God; Objection 2 does so by including the property
in the divine essence (which is presumed to be instantiated in the actual
world). Of course, it may be true that being perfectly good is a conceptual
requirement of being God and/or an essential property of (the being who
is in fact) God. But simply to insist on this is to reject the view under discussion without giving any argument against it.
Objection 3: According to the Molinist view under discussion, there are
possible worlds in which God does evil. But this is incompatible with
15
By the same reasoning, such a being is not God at any time in any world. Given that
everything is what it is essentially, if a being is not God in W, then it could not be God—i.e.,
there is no possible world in which that being is God.
16
This does not imply that there are worlds in which God does not exist.
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perfect being theology. To see this, compare two beings, P and Q. Both
beings are such that, for every great-making property x, both possess x
in x’s quantitatively maximal form.17 Furthermore, with the exception of
perfect goodness, P and Q both possess every such great-making quality
in every world in which they exist. The only salient difference between P
and Q with respect to their greatness is this: P is perfectly good in every
possible world, whereas Q does evil in some possible but unactual world.
It seems that Q is a being than which a greater is possible (in Anselm’s
terms: a being-than-which-a-greater-can-be-conceived); in fact, it seems
clear that P is such a being. Thus, if God is merely contingently good, then
it is possible that there exists a being that is greater than God. But this
is incoherent: God is, of logical necessity, the greatest possible being. So
there is no possible world in which God does evil.
Response to Objection 3: This objection is not question-begging, but
there are reasons to reject it, nonetheless. One might, of course, reject
it on the grounds that one rejects the perfect being theology that motivates it. But another, more satisfying response is available to the Molinist: she can argue that a transworldly good being is better than an essentially good being. The strategy for making such a case is straightforward:
the Molinist first argues that essential goodness is logically incompatible
with freedom (with respect to willing the good), which, in turn, entails
that an essentially good being is neither morally responsible nor morally praiseworthy.18 The Molinist then presents us with two candidates
for the greatest possible being: P is essentially perfectly good but not
morally praiseworthy, Q is transworldly good and morally praiseworthy, and both beings possess maximal forms of every other great-making
property. The Molinist then argues that, among the logically possible
candidates, the greatest possible being is Q: a being who is “merely”
transworldly good.
How successful is this strategy? Its success depends, first, on whether
the initial argument for the incompatibility of divine essential goodness
and freedom is compelling. One obvious way to challenge this argument
is to embrace compatibilism with respect to divine freedom. The libertarian, of course, will reject this as pseudo-freedom, but—in addition to
rehearsing the standard anti-compatibilist arguments—she also can note
that the argument can be reframed to accommodate the assumption that
freedom and determinism are logically compatible. If they are, then the
two candidates for greatest possible being are P, a being who is essentially good but “merely” compatibilistically free (and who possesses maximal forms of all other great-making properties), and Q, a being who is
17
This may be an impossible state of affairs. Most would contend that power is a greatmaking quality, and omnipotence is its maximal form, but it is doubtful that two beings
both could be omnipotent in the same world. If not, let P and Q possess the maximal form
of every great-making quality that it is possible for both to have. For present purposes, this
will suffice.
18
This is the argument discussed in section I.
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incompatibilistically free but “merely” transworldly good (and who possesses maximal forms of all other great-making properties). Molinists can
go on to argue that, even if compatibilistic freedom is possible, possessing
incompatibilistic freedom is a superior great-making property in comparison to possessing compatibilistic freedom, and thus, among the options,
the incompatibilistically free / transworldly good being is superior to the
compatibilistically free / essentially good being—and thus Q is the greatest possible being.19 For this to be convincing, however, one must find
it intuitively obvious that lacking incompatibilistic freedom in the actual
world is worse than lacking perfect goodness in some merely possible
world. But many theists will concede this: in particular, those who advocate the solution of transworld goodness will. For such theists, Objection
3 will not be compelling.
Objection 4: A transworldly good being is a being such that, for every
possible circumstance T, if T were actual, that being would will the good
in T. But, when combined with God’s other attributes, divine transworld
goodness turns out to be identical to “standard” divine contingent goodness. Transworld goodness is distinct from “standard” contingent goodness only for a being who can find itself in different possible circumstances, which God cannot. To see this, consider the following. Orthodox theists
hold that God is the creator of the world, and those philosophically minded among this group would add that, necessarily, in every possible world
W, God weakly actualizes W—i.e., God is the creator of whatever exists
contingently in W and He brings about everything that can be brought
about in W without violating the freedom of the free creatures who exist in
W. In every possible world, there is a “moment” logically prior to creation
in which God decides which world to actualize. For the sake of simplicity, let us speak of God as “deliberating” about which world to actualize
in this moment,20 and let C denote this state of affairs. The problem is
this. Given the assumption of counterfactuals of divine freedom, there is a
fact of the matter about what God would freely choose in C. Given divine
transworld goodness, the fact of the matter is that God would choose to
will the good in C. But God’s act of creation is all-encompassing, meaning
(among other things) that every future circumstance in which God faces a
morally significant choice is one that God Himself chooses to weakly actualize in C. Thus, God as a transworldly good being really is no different
than God as a “standard” contingently good being: each is a being who
wills the good in C in the actual world—thereby determining every future circumstance that He will find Himself in—and fails to will the good
(to various degrees) in C in other possible worlds. Insofar as “mere” divine contingent goodness is theologically unacceptable, divine transworld
19
Again, it is being assumed that P and Q possess the maximal form of every other greatmaking property.
20
The notion of divine deliberation, construed literally, is rendered problematic by the
doctrines of divine foreknowledge as well as divine eternality, but speaking this way metaphorically makes the argument at hand a bit easier to follow, I hope.
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goodness is unacceptable, as well. Predicating transworld goodness of the
divine essence solves nothing.
Response to Objection 4: This objection conflates two different issues. One
is the issue of whether God can do evil—the issue of the present essay. The
other is the issue of whether God must, of metaphysical necessity, will the
best. Nothing in the Molinist solution under discussion requires that there
is a (single) best possible world for God to weakly actualize; a fortiori,
it does not require that God must actualize the best possible world. Divine transworld goodness requires, first, that God chooses a morally good
course of action in C—presumably, this means that God chooses to weakly
actualize a good world—and, second, that no matter which (good) world
He had chosen to actualize, He would have chosen to will the good in that
world every time He faced a morally significant choice. There is, of course,
a fact of the matter about what God chooses in C in the actual world. But
there are (presumably) other decisions that God could have made in C
that would have been consistent with His transworld goodness: God’s
willing the good is consistent with His willing any number of different
actions. Thus, the distinction between divine transworld goodness and
“standard” divine contingent goodness, necessary to sustain the Molinist
view under discussion, remains intact. The claim that God is transworldly
good is stronger than the claim that God is contingently good: the former
entails the latter, but not vice-versa.
Objection 5: The Molinist view under discussion faces a dilemma when
forced to specify whether the counterfactuals of divine freedom (CDFs)
are prevolitional or postvolitional. The issue is whether the truth values of
the CDFs are up to God—that is, whether their truth values are logically
prior to any divine act of will. If so—that is, if the CDFs are prevolitional—
then God is not responsible for their truth values, even though the CDFs
are contingent. Nothing in God’s nature grounds their truth values, for in
this case they would be necessary. So on the assumption that the CDFs are
prevolitional, it seems that it is just a matter of luck that God is transworldly good. But this is clearly inconsistent with the idea of God as maximally
perfect. Surely the extent of God’s goodness cannot be a strange sort of
moral luck, for in this case it would contribute nothing to his greatness or
perfection. The Molinist is thus pushed to the conclusion that the CDFs
are postvolitional: their truth values are determined by some divine act
of will. On this view, there is some moment (logical moment, at least) at
which the truth values of the CDFs are unsettled, and a later moment at
which God somehow settles them—a moment in which He freely chooses
to confer upon Himself the property of transworld goodness. In this case,
it is not a matter of luck that God possesses transworld goodness, but the
Molinist instead faces a different problem, one which pertains to God’s
moral status at the moment prior to when He makes His choice to give
himself this property. The troublesome issue for the Molinist is whether,
at this moment, God is perfectly good or not. The Molinist surely wants
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to claim that He is,21 and she will want to further claim that His decision
to confer upon himself the property of transworld goodness is a reflection
of this and not the result of some arbitrary decision or whim. But if God is
perfectly good even prior to His decision to give Himself transworld goodness, then at this moment of decision, God lacks any desire or inclination
to choose evil—or even to choose that He would do evil in certain counterfactual scenarios. It appears, then, that God’s choice to confer upon Himself transworld goodness is not free, but rather determined by His own
nature—in particular, the motivational structure that comes with being
perfectly good. But if God is not free in choosing to be transworldly good,
then He is not praiseworthy for His transworld goodness, in which case,
the whole point of the Molinist project under discussion is undermined.22
This final objection is the one I regard as the most serious, and for this
reason I will devote the most space to it. It seems to me that this objection
contains a terminological confusion, and once this confusion is cleared up,
a false dichotomy is revealed. In response to the question of whether the
CDFs are prevolitional or postvolitional, classical Molinists—those following the lead of Molina himself—opt for the latter: the CDFs are postvolitional.23 On their view, divine creation extends not only to settling the
question of which world God will weakly actualize, but also the question
of which world God would have weakly actualized if the counterfactuals
of creaturely freedom had been different. As Thomas Flint puts it, “His
single act of will, then, makes infinitely many counterfactuals of divine
freedom true.”24 It seem to me, however, that part of the motivation of the
classical Molinist view at this point is the assumption that God is essentially perfectly good. If God is “merely” transworldly good, then adopting this line will lead to trouble—precisely the trouble described in the
foregoing objection.
Is the advocate of transworld goodness, then, pushed to the view that
the CDFs are prevolitional? In fact, she is not. But this is where the terminological confusion needs to be cleared up. In the preceding objection,
“prevolitional” was characterized as meaning “not up to God” and “logically prior to any divine act of will.” This is a natural way of characterizing
“prevolitional,” because it aptly describes God’s relationship to the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Their truth values are settled logically
prior to God’s creative choice, and there is nothing that God can do about
21
Note that this is not to claim that God is essentially perfectly good, but only that there is
no moment—logical “moments” included—at which God is not perfectly good in the actual
world.
22
I am indebted to Wes Morriston for developing this objection in his commentary on an
earlier draft of this paper presented at the 2009 Central APA meeting.
23
See Louis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, ed. and trans.
Alfred J. Freddoso (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), 173–175, disputation
52, section 13. For commentary on this part of Molina’s view, see Thomas P. Flint, Divine
Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), 55–57.
24
Flint, Divine Providence, 57.
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them—i.e., there is nothing God could do such that, were He to do it, their
truth values would be different. But when we turn to God’s relationship
to the counterfactuals of divine freedom, it becomes clear that “not up to
God” and “logically prior to any divine act of will” denote separate—and
separable—properties.
The easiest way to see this is to think about the relationship of creatures
to counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs). Suppose that C → A is a
true CCF; it describes which action an agent S would freely choose to perform if some circumstance C were actual. What relationship does S bear to
this CCF? Is it prevolitional for S, or postvolitional for S? On the standard
Molinist account, it is postvolitional, and this is so even though its truth
value is logically prior (in fact also temporally prior) to any volitional act of
S. Though S does not make or cause it to be true that C → A,25 nevertheless
this CCF is postvolitional for S because it is still “up to S” in the relevant
sense: namely, S has counterfactual control over it. That is to say, there
is something that S could do such that, were S to do it, C → A would be
false. By contrast, a certain counterfactual of freedom is prevolitional for
an agent S just in case S possesses no such counterfactual control over it.26
What I want to suggest is that the proponent of transworld goodness
should regard God’s relation to the CDFs as being much like a creature’s
relation to the set of CCFs that are “about” that creature (with the obvious exception that the CDFs do not preexist God). The truth values of the
CDFs are logically prior to any divine act of will, such that God does not
make or cause them to be true, but they are nevertheless up to God in the
aforementioned sense: God possesses counterfactual control over them.
Thus the CDFs are postvolitional for God. But they are not postvolitional
in the sense that the classical Molinist claims—they are not settled by God
in a single creative act of will—which is what allows the proponent of
transworld goodness to avoid the aforementioned objection.
But in this case, is not the view under discussion vulnerable to the same
objection that was raised against the prevolitional view? Recall that the
critic’s principal objection to the prevolitional view is that it renders it a
matter of luck that God possesses transworld goodness, in which case, God
is not praiseworthy for it. This might seem also to follow from the solution
I have suggested: that the CDFs are logically prior to, and thus not the result of, any divine act. The critic reasons that, unless transworld goodness
is entailed by features of God’s nature (in which case it would be an essential property of God rather than a contingent one), it just happens to be that
God possesses transworld goodness. Thus the dilemma: God’s possession
of transworld goodness is either necessary, in which case the view collapses into the doctrine of divine essential goodness, or it is a matter of luck.
I think this dilemma is a false one, and in much the same way as the (in)famous dilemma of determinism. Compatibilists often insist that libertarian
Ibid., 123–124.
I am grateful to Tom Flint for helping me to get clear about this point.
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freedom reduces to randomness on the grounds that there is no sufficient
explanation for a (supposed) libertarian free choice, but as libertarians often point out, this response to libertarianism is question-begging: it simply assumes that every non-random event can be adequately explained,
and that the only adequate explanation of an event is one for which a
sufficient reason can be given.27 Precisely what libertarians hold is that
a free choice, initiated by an act of agent causation, is an event which is
caused (by the agent) but not determined. The choice can be adequately
explained in terms of the agent’s reasons, character, etc., but all such explanations will fall short of providing a sufficient reason for the choice
(because the agent could have chosen otherwise). Likewise, regarding
the view I have suggested, the critic implicitly assumes that if there is
no sufficient reason for God’s possessing transworld goodness—such as
we would have if transworld goodness were a part of God’s essential nature—then it is a brute, inexplicable, lucky fact that God possesses it. But
this is not so. God’s possessing transworld goodness can be adequately
explained in terms of God’s character—by the fact that He is perfectly
loving, just, knowledgeable, rational, etc.—so long as by “adequate” we
are not demanding a sufficient explanation (in the technical sense of the
term). God’s being perfectly loving, etc. makes it intelligible why, if He had
been in a different set of circumstances, He still would have willed the
good. To point out that this fails to provide a sufficient explanation is irrelevant, given that the purpose of the project is to provide a solution to
the problem of divine freedom on the assumption that a version of libertarianism (viz., Molinism) is true.28 Note also that, by explaining the basis
of divine transworld goodness in this way, it becomes clear why this is a
property for which God can reasonably be praised. The fact (if it is such)
that God is transworldly good says something about God’s character. This,
I think, is the intuition behind the ordinary theist’s claim that God would
not ever do anything evil. Compare with similar claims about human persons: “Smith is a good man; he would never tell a lie.” The claim, if true,
says something significant about Smith—something for which Smith is
morally praiseworthy. And likewise for God: if it is true of Him that He
would not, under any circumstances, will something evil, then this says
something about His character for which He is praiseworthy.
27
See, for example, C. A. Campbell’s “Has the Self ‘Free Will’?” in Reason and Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy, Ninth Ed., ed. Joel Feinberg (Belmont,
Albany, et al.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1996), 453–454.
28
Of course, the analogy to the dilemma of determinism is not perfect. In the case of libertarian free choices, there is something that we can “point to”—namely, the causal activity
of the agent—which grounds the truth-values of propositions about the agent’s choices. But
what could we point to which grounds the truth value of the CDFs? I leave it to Molinists
to answer this question, which is, of course, just the oft-rehearsed grounding objection to
middle knowledge. My project here is to show that there is an adequate solution to the problem of divine freedom on the assumption that Molinism is true. It is not a part of my project to
defend Molinism. I aim to show only that Molinists, to the extent that they have adequate
responses to all the standard objections to Molinism, have available to them an adequate
solution to the problem of divine freedom.
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One final point: Some readers have expressed concern that my view
does not seem to them substantially different from that defended by Nelson Pike.29 I take it that there are important differences. For one, Pike’s analysis treats “God” as a title rather than a proper name, an assumption which
has important implications for the conclusions he draws: for example, that
“God cannot sin” expresses a logically necessary truth. I have carried on
the discussion primarily in terms of essences—specifically, the set of properties essential to the divine nature—and have worked under the assumption that being God is an essential property of the being who is in fact God.
Nevertheless, these readers may be right that there is substantial overlap
between the Molinist view I have defended and Pike’s view that “The individual that is God cannot sin in that sinning would be contrary to a firm and
stable feature of his nature.”30 I myself am not sure how much Pike’s view
overlaps the one I have defended, because I do not understand the way
Pike uses the terms “material” and “materially” in his essay, which seems
necessary to make this judgment. He at times suggests that a material possibility is a “real” possibility, in contrast to a mere logical possibility.31 Elsewhere he suggests that “God cannot sin” might be interpreted so that “the
‘cannot’ in ‘cannot sin’ does not express logical impossibility” but rather “a
material concept—that of a limitation of creative-power”; he contrasts this
with another understanding in which “God cannot sin” is taken to mean
“that although the individual that is God (Yahweh) has the ability (i.e., the
creative power necessary) to bring about states of affairs the production of
which would be morally reprehensible, His own nature or character is such
as to provide material assurance that He will not act in this way.”32 He concludes that God’s doing something evil is “logically possible but materially
excluded.”33 I find this usage of “material” and its derivatives confusing;
it apparently is not meant to denote the material implication of first-order
logic (famous for its inadequacy in accounting for ordinary counterfactual
reasoning). But then, what is it? One might take it that Pike is intending to
express just the view that I have described in this paper: that God’s character is such that He would not, as a matter of fact, will evil under any circumstance, even though He could. Those readers who interpret Pike this way
should read my essay as offering a kind of analysis of Pike’s suggestion: a
way of understanding, in technical terms, the idea of stability or firmness of
divine character to which Pike appeals, but does not explain.
III. Conclusion
Undoubtedly, further objections to the Molinist solution that I have
sketched in this paper are possible, and proponents of this solution would
Pike, “Omnipotence and God’s Ability to Sin.”
Ibid., 82.
31
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need to address these to make a decisive case for the view. Nevertheless,
the aforementioned objections seem to me the most important ones, so
I conclude, tentatively, that this solution provides one feasible way that
the orthodox theist can successfully resolve the version of the problem of
divine freedom addressed in this paper.
Of course, the solution I have proposed is only as strong as its Molinist
foundation, and this is a foundation rejected by a great many orthodox
theists. As I mentioned previously, it is not a full-fledged Molinism that is
needed for the solution defended in this paper, but only the minimal claim
that there are true counterfactuals of freedom. Nevertheless, the grounding objection, which seems to be the most widely-cited reason for rejecting
Molinism, targets just this claim. Those who find this objection compelling
will not regard transworld goodness as a viable solution, even if the present discussion has convinced them that it would be if counterfactuals of
freedom could be true.
In fact, the solution I have defended will be judged unacceptable even
by many Molinists. I have nowhere claimed that Molinists must accept
the doctrine of transworld goodness, either in the sense that transworld
goodness is entailed by Molinism or that Molinists have no other viable
options. The solution developed here is one option for Molinists—and
anyone else who might accept the view that there are true counterfactuals
of freedom—but it remains open to them to reject it in favor of another
solution. Many theists, Molinist and non-Molinist alike, will no doubt reject this solution on the grounds that they have a strong intuition that
being perfectly good is an essential property of God and/or a conceptual
requirement of being God. The response to Objections 1 and 2 in the previous section discussed why appeal to this intuition does not undercut
the view that God is transworldly good (to review: insisting on the truth
of this intuition is question-begging against the proponent of divine transworld goodness). Nevertheless, those who have this intuition are within
their epistemic rights to reject the view that God is merely transworldly
good. Or, at any rate, theists who have this intuition are within their rights
to do so if they are willing to reject (1). I have elsewhere developed what
I take to be the best solution to the problem of divine freedom for those
theists, like myself, who are unwilling to relinquish the doctrine of divine
essential goodness.34 But I remain convinced that the solution developed
in the present paper is viable if Molinism is viable, and that this is the best
solution available to those who are unwilling to relinquish or mitigate the
Principle of Alternate Possibilities.35
Southwest Baptist University
34
R. Zachary Manis, “On Divine Essential Goodness and the Nature of Divine Freedom,”
unpublished manuscript.
35
I am indebted to Bill Rowe, Wes Morriston, and Tom Flint for helpful critiques and
stimulating discussion of earlier drafts of this paper.

